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SEARCHES AND SEIZURES—NIGHTTIME EXECUTION:  THE 
NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT FINDS WARRANT 
LACKING SEPARATE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR  
NIGHTTIME EXECUTION 
State v. Holly, 2013 ND 94, 833 N.W.2D 15 
ABSTRACT 
 
In State v. Holly, the North Dakota Supreme Court rejected the  
good-faith exception and inevitable discovery doctrine as exceptions to an 
“anytime” warrant found to be lacking separate probable cause for 
nighttime execution.  Holly alleged the warrant affidavit lacked probable 
cause, making the search of his vehicle and residence illegal.  The court 
reversed the defendant’s criminal judgments that were based on evidence 
found in his residence, but affirmed criminal judgments based on the 
evidence found in the defendant’s vehicle.  In finding an invalid search of 
the appellant’s home, but a valid search of the car in the driveway, the 
North Dakota Supreme Court altered what constitutes a “reasonable” search 
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I. FACTS 
On February 7, 2011, law enforcement received information from 
Micah Sesseman that John Holly, the informant’s roommate, would be 
transporting marijuana and prescription drugs from Whitefish, Montana to 
their shared residence in Minot, North Dakota.1  Sesseman informed law 
enforcement that Holly would be traveling in a white Ford Ranger with 
Texas license plates, that the vehicle would be driven by his girlfriend, a 
third roommate, and that Holly and his girlfriend would arrive in Minot the 
 
1.  State v. Holly, 2013 ND 94, ¶ 2, 833 N.W.2d 15, 20. 
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following evening.2  On February 8, Officer Graham visited the defendant’s 
residence to meet with Sesseman.3  While Officer Graham was at the shared 
residence, Sesseman entered Holly’s bedroom.4  From where Officer 
Graham stood in the living room, he observed a glass smoking device on 
Holly’s dresser.5 
After visiting Sesseman, Officer Graham sought a search warrant for 
Holly’s vehicle and residence.6  The magistrate issued a warrant allowing 
law enforcement to search the vehicle and residence during the daytime.7  
At the request of Officer Graham, the warrant was later modified, with 
judicial approval, to “anytime” and was executed on February 8, 2011 at 
10:14 p.m.8  From Holly’s vehicle, the officers seized two plastic bags of 
marijuana, one plastic bag of approximately twenty-six pills of 
Clonazepam,9 a plastic bag of Psilocyn,10 hallucinogenic mushrooms, and 
one glass smoking device.11  From Holly’s residence, the officers seized a 
plastic bag containing aluminum foil that contained Testosterone 
Propionate,12 a digital scale with marijuana residue, a plastic tub containing 
various size plastic bags and marijuana residue, a glass smoking device, and 
one metal smoking device.13 
Holly moved to suppress the evidence seized in his home and residence 
based on a lack of probable cause.14  Specifically, the defendant alleged the 
warrant affidavit did not establish the reliability of the informant or the 
separate probable cause required for the issuance of an “anytime” warrant.15  
Holly also argued that law enforcement’s observation of a glass smoking 
device in his bedroom constituted an illegal search.16  Additionally, Holly 
moved to suppress the evidence based on the warrant affidavit’s reference 
 
2.  Id. 
3.  Id. ¶ 3. 
4.  Id. 
5.  Id. 
6.  Id. ¶ 4. 
7.  Id. 
8.  Id. ¶ 5, 833 N.W.2d at 21. 
9.  Clonazepam is a benzodiazepine prescription medication that decreases abnormal 
electrical activity in the brain and is often used to treat seizures and panic attacks. 
10.  A hallucinogenic compound generally found in psychedelic mushrooms. 
11.  Holly, ¶ 5, 833 N.W.2d at 21. 
12.  Testosterone Propionate is a steroid that increases testosterone levels in the body and is 
typically prescribed for individuals who are unable to produce necessary levels of testosterone on 
their own. 
13.  Holly, ¶ 5, 833 N.W.2d at 21. 
14.  Id. ¶ 6, 833 N.W.2d at 22. 
15.  Id. 
16.  Id. 
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to “six pounds” of marijuana.17  The motion argued Officer Graham either 
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, referenced the 
marijuana in an attempt to mislead the magistrate when obtaining the search 
warrant.18  The trial court denied the motion to suppress.19  The trial court 
concluded that Officer Graham did mislead the magistrate even though the 
information was later found to be incorrect.20  The trial court found Holly 
guilty of six counts of possession of controlled substances21 and possession 
of drug paraphernalia.22  While the court found Holly not guilty on the 
charge of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, it did find Holly 
guilty of a lesser-included offense of possession of a controlled  
substance—- marijuana greater than one ounce.23  On appeal, Holly argued 
the trial court erred in finding him guilty of a lesser-included offense, 
denying his motions to suppress, and denying his motion for a judgment of 
acquittal.24 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Article I, section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution, which includes 
language modeled after the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures.25  
As part of this protection, a search conducted without a warrant is presumed 
to be invalid.26  To obtain a search warrant, law enforcement officers must 
establish probable cause.27  In North Dakota, probable cause exists where 
 
17.  Id. 
18.  Id.  
19.  Id. 
20.  Id. 
21.  Specifically, the trial court found Holly guilty of:  (1) possession of a schedule III 
controlled substance greater than one ounce; (2) possession of a schedule III controlled substance; 
(3) possession of drug paraphernalia, other than marijuana; (4) possession of drug paraphernalia, 
marijuana; (5) possession of Psilocyn; (6) possession of a schedule IV controlled substance; and 
(7) possession of drug paraphernalia, other than marijuana.  Id. ¶ 1, 831 N.W.2d at 20. 
22.  Id. ¶ 8, 831 N.W.2d at 21. 
23.  Id. 
24.  Id. ¶ 9. 
25.  N.D. CONST. art. I, § 8 guarantees: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized. 
26.  Courts often state that warrants are preferred.  In cases where there is no warrant, the 
burden of proving the search’s validity is on the government. 
27.  Probable cause arises when “the facts and circumstances within . . . [the officers’] 
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is 
being committed.”  Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). 
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the “facts and circumstances relied on by the magistrate would warrant a 
person of reasonable caution to believe the contraband . . . will be found in 
the place to be searched.”28  The North Dakota Supreme Court uses a 
totality of the circumstances approach in determining whether information 
presented to a magistrate was sufficient to establish probable cause.29  
Specifically, the court has found that probable cause is “the sum total of 
layers of information and the synthesis of what the police have heard, what 
they know, and what they observed as trained officers.”30  The Court has 
declared that the standard for probable cause “does not require the 
commission of the offense be established with absolute certainty, or proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt and may even be less than a preponderance of 
the evidence.”31 
There are a number of ways to establish probable cause, including 
personal observations, hearsay, and a combination of the two, which is 
known as corroboration.32  The North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure 
allow for a probable cause finding to be “based upon hearsay evidence in 
whole or in part.”33  Hearsay used to establish probable cause may come 
from a named or unnamed informant.34  In North Dakota, police officers 
and ordinary citizens are presumed to be reliable, while the credibility of a 
person from “criminal milieu” must be established.35 
Federal law recognizes that a source’s veracity may be reinforced by 
independent police verification where it was initially insufficient, and the 
source’s basis of knowledge may be reinforced by verified details.36  While 
the sources of information in the affidavit can vary, the four corners rule37 
establishes that a reviewing court cannot consider anything not in the 
warrant, affidavit, or recorded testimony when considering probable 
 
28.  State v. Nelson, 2005 ND 59, ¶ 3, 693 N.W.2d 910, 913. 
29.  Holly, ¶ 12, 833 N.W.2d at 22. 
30.  State v. Guthmiller, 2002 ND 116, ¶ 10, 646 N.W.2d 724, 728. 
31.  State v. Spidahl, 2004 ND 168, ¶ 11, 686 N.W.2d 115, 118. 
32.  North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 is an adaptation of Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 41 and implements the provisions of the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, 
section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution. 
33.  N.D. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1)(c). 
34.  A confidential informant is a person known to the police, but whose identity is 
concealed from the magistrate.  State v. Roth, 2004 ND 23, ¶ 11, 674 N.W.2d 495, 500. 
35.  State v. Boushee, 284 N.W.2d 423, 430 (N.D. 1979). 
36.  Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 418 (1969). 
37.  “In making this independent determination as to the existence of probable cause, the 
reviewing court may not look beyond the four corners of the affidavit or application for issuance 
of the warrant.”  State v. Schmalz, 2008 ND 27, ¶ 13, 744 N.W.2d 734, 738. 
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cause.38  After a probable cause finding has been made, a reviewing court 
gives great deference to the issuing court’s determination.39 
A. SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN NORTH DAKOTA 
Most search and seizure related issues are addressed by statute or 
rule.40  In general, North Dakota requires search warrants to be served 
within ten days of issuance.  In addition, warrants must be served during the 
daytime hours of 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m., unless a magistrate authorizes an 
anticipatory or nighttime warrant.41 
1. Nighttime Execution: When Law Enforcement Needs Separate 
Probable Cause 
The North Dakota Supreme Court was first presented with the issue of 
nighttime service of a search warrant in State v. Schmeets.42  Schmeets was 
charged with the possession of a controlled substance after law enforcement 
found cocaine in his residence during a search conducted pursuant to a 
warrant.43  Schmeets sought to suppress the evidence on the grounds that 
the search warrant lacked probable cause and had been executed at night in 
violation of Rule 41(c) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure.44  
The district court denied the motion to suppress, and Schmeets appealed the 
conviction.45  On review, the North Dakota Supreme Court articulated that 
the purpose of Rule 41(c) “is to protect citizens from being subjected to the 
trauma of unwarranted nighttime searches.”46  The court acknowledged that 
the form on which the warrant in Schmeets was drafted created confusion 
regarding the specific time for execution.47  Ultimately, however, the court 
declined to rule on the issue, having already found the warrant invalid due 
to insufficient probable cause.48 
 
38.  See generally State v. Schmeets, 278 N.W.2d 401 (N.D. 1979). 
39.  State v. Holly, 2013 ND 94, ¶ 11, 833 N.W.2d 15, 22. 
40.  Specifically, criminal procedure rules are addressed by North Dakota Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 41 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41. 
41.  North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c) provides:  “The warrant shall be served 
in the daytime, unless the issuing authority, by appropriate provision in the warrant, and for 
reasonable cause shown, authorizes its execution at times other than daytime.”  N.D. R. CRIM. P. 
41(c). 
42.  Schmeets, 278 N.W.2d at 404. 
43.  Id. 
44.  Id. 
45.  Id.  
46.  Id. at 410. 
47.  Id. 
48.  Id. 
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In State v. Fields,49 the North Dakota Supreme Court found a violation 
in the execution of a nighttime search warrant.50  Looking to Rule 41(c)(1), 
the court considered whether the magistrate had adequate probable cause 
for authorizing a nighttime search of Fields’s home.51  The court reiterated 
that probable cause for a nighttime search “exists upon a showing that the 
evidence sought may be quickly and easily disposed of, and . . . drugs are 
such evidence.”52  The court found the facts insufficient to support the 
government’s argument that the defendant’s odd hours and propensity for 
violence constituted sufficient probable cause for nighttime execution, and 
suppressed the evidence.53  Perhaps most importantly, this case resulted in 
an overruling of the per-se rule justifying the issuance of nighttime search 
warrants in drug cases.54 
In another post-conviction case, Roth v. State,55 the North Dakota 
Supreme Court again addressed a challenge based on the authorization of a 
nighttime search.56  The district court had not decided whether there was 
probable cause for a nighttime search.57  On review, the majority found that 
there were adequate facts to support the necessary probable cause for a 
nighttime search where the defendant was likely to be cooking 
methamphetamine during nighttime hours, as shown by law enforcement’s 
surveillance of the defendant’s activities.58  The majority also noted in dicta 
that the good-faith exception would also apply in this case.59  However, the 
Roth decision was not unanimous, and Justice Maring’s dissent expressed 
her belief that there was neither probable cause nor a good-faith 
exception.60 
2. Open Fields and Plain View Doctrine:  When Law 
Enforcement Does Not Need Probable Cause 
Since the Fourth Amendment protections are limited to “persons, 
houses, papers, and effects,” they do not apply where contraband is 
 
49.  2005 ND 15, 691 N.W.2d 233. 
50.  Id. ¶ 1, 691 N.W.2d at 234. 
51.  North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c)(1) requires the issuing magistrate find a 
sufficient showing of probable cause to justify the authorization of a nighttime search. N.D. R. 
CRIM. P. 41(c)(1). 
52.  Fields, ¶ 10, 278 N.W.2d at 237. 
53.  Id. ¶ 14, 278 N.W.2d at 238. 
54.  Id. ¶ 10, 278 N.W.2d at 237. 
55.  2007 ND 112, 735 N.W.2d 882. 
56.  Id. ¶ 1, 735 N.W.2d at 882. 
57.  Id. ¶16, 735 N.W.2d at 890. 
58.  Id. ¶ 27, 735 N.W.2d at 892-93. 
59.  Id. ¶ 30, 735 N.W.2d at 893. 
60.  Id. ¶ 36, 735 N.W.2d at 895. 
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observed in an open field.61  At common law, open fields include anything 
outside of the home or curtilage.62  The rationale for this doctrine lies in 
language of the Fourth Amendment and case law emphasizing society’s 
reasonable expectations of privacy.63  Similarly, the plain view doctrine 
allows items that are evidence of a crime to be seized without a warrant 
when they are in plain view of a law enforcement officer who is standing 
inside a constitutionally protected area.64 
B. APPLICATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN NORTH DAKOTA 
The exclusionary rule operates to suppress evidence where there has 
been a constitutional violation.65  States courts, which find violations of 
rules and statutes, may or may not suppress evidence.  As a general rule, 
North Dakota does not use exclusionary remedies for statutory violations.66  
Violations of rules, such as Rule 41, are not required to have suppression 
remedies, but the North Dakota Supreme Court has suppressed evidence 
where it has found rule violations, generally without discussion about 
whether an exclusionary sanction is required.67 
 
61.  The Fourth Amendment of United States Constitution states the right of the people to be 
“secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be search, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
62.  Curtilage is considered to be the land immediately surrounding and associated with the 
home.  The curtilage “is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the 
‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.’”  Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 
(1886). 
63.  The United States Supreme Court has found no illegal search where law enforcement 
installed a microphone to the outside of a public telephone booth because there was no physical 
penetration of the booth and because the defendant could have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy speaking at a public telephone booth.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
64.  In Horton v. California, law enforcement had probable cause to search a home for 
evidence of a robbery.  496 U.S. 128, 130-31 (1990).  The warrant neglected to list potential 
weapons, which law enforcement found in plain view while searching for proceeds of the robbery.  
Id. at 131.  The majority found the plain view doctrine applied because law enforcement was not 
searching beyond its authorization when it found the weapons.  Id. at 142. 
65.  There are multiple suppression rules, including the Fourth Amendment guarantee against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
66.  But see Kuntz v. State Highway Comm’r, 405 N.W.2d 285, 290 (N.D. 1987) (finding a 
“qualified” statutory right for defendant to consult with attorney before making chemical test 
decisions in a DUI driver’s license case.”). 
67.  Following United States Supreme Court precedent, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
generally applies exclusionary remedies where it finds a violation of the state constitution.  See 
State v. Lunde, 2008 ND 142, ¶ 15, 752 N.W.2d 630, 636. 
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1. The Good-Faith Exception 
The United States Supreme Court developed the reasonable good-faith 
exception as an exception to the exclusionary rule when the costs of 
exclusions outweigh the benefits.68  The rationale behind the exception is 
that no deterrence purposes are served where a police officer who 
objectively, and in good faith, obtains and executes a warrant that is later 
found to be invalid.69  North Dakota adopted the good faith exception in 
State v. Herrick,70 but avoided its application under the North Dakota 
Constitution.71  The court found that police officers acted in objectively 
reasonable reliance on a no-knock warrant issued by a judge.72  In the 
dissent, Justice Maring emphasized her view that the court should have 
directly addressed the good faith exception as it applies to the state 
Constitution, and Justice Maring cited North Dakota cases relying upon the 
state constitution.73 
North Dakota recognizes the four federally recognized exceptions to 
the good-faith doctrine.74  The North Dakota Supreme Court has stated that 
an officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s authorization is not reasonable 
where: 
(1) the issuing magistrate was misled by false information 
intentionally or negligently given by the affiant; (2) when the 
magistrate totally abandoned her judicial role and failed to act in a 
neutral and detached manner; (3) when the warrant was based on 
an affidavit ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render 
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable;’ and (4) when 
a reasonable law enforcement officer could not rely on a facially 
deficient warrant.75 
2. The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine 
Another federal exception to the exclusionary rule recognized in North 
Dakota is the inevitable discovery doctrine.76  In State v. Phelps,77 the 
 
68.  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). 
69.  Id. at 921-22. 
70.  1999 ND 1, 588 N.W.2d 847. 
71.  Id. ¶ 27, 588 N.W.2d at 852. 
72.  Id. ¶ 20, 588 N.W.2d at 851. 
73.  Id. ¶ 52, 588 N.W.2d at 856. 
74.  Id. ¶ 15, 588 N.W.2d at 850. 
75.  Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984)). 
76.  The inevitable discovery doctrine allows the government the opportunity to prove that 
law enforcement would have discovered the illegally obtained evidence regardless of the illegal 
search or seizure.  State v. Smith, 2005 ND 21, ¶ 31, 691 N.W.2d. 203, 212. 
77.  287 N.W.2d 769 (N.D. 1980). 
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North Dakota Supreme Court examined evidence derived from information 
that was obtained through an illegal search.  The court held that the 
evidence would not be inadmissible if the police had not acted in a bad-faith 
effort to accelerate the discovery of the evidence and if the evidence would 
have been discovered despite the illegal activity.78 
In order for the inevitable discovery doctrine to apply, the state must 
meet a two-prong test.79  First, the court stated, “use of the doctrine is 
permitted only when the police have not acted in bad faith to accelerate the 
discovery of the evidence in question,” and next, “the State must prove that 
the evidence would have been found without the unlawful activity and must 
show how the discovery of the evidence would have occurred.”80  In 
Phelps, the state submitted photographs of the defendant to illustrate what 
police officers observed about the defendant prior to the illegal search.81  
This proved that the officers were aware of the defendant’s wounds, 
regardless of the search of his clothes.82 
In State v. Johnson,83 a deputy sheriff seized an air compressor without 
a warrant believing it to be stolen property.84  The district court denied 
Johnson’s motion to suppress based on unlawful seizure, stating it found no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in Johnson’s driveway, where the item 
had been located.85  Applying the two-prong test developed in Phelps, the 
North Dakota Supreme Court rejected the inevitable discovery doctrine.86  
The court found the state could not satisfy the first prong requiring law 
enforcement to not have acted in bad faith in an effort to accelerate the 
discovery of the evidence in question.87  With somewhat strong language, 
the court found that “in no instance is this type of shortcut more apparent 
than in [this] case in which the warrant requirement was bypassed in the 
absence of exigent circumstances.”88 
 
78.  Id. at 775. 
79.  See State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 258 (Iowa 1979) (adopting a two-prong 
inevitable-discovery theory similar to that of other states, as promoted in Professor LaFave’s 
treatise, 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., SEARCH AND SEIZURE:  A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 11.4, at 622 (1978)). 
80.  Phelps, 287 N.W.2d at 775. 
81.  Id. 
82.  Id. 
83.  301 N.W.2d 625 (N.D. 1981). 
84.  Id. at 626. 
85.  Id. 
86.  Id. at 629. 
87.  Id. 
88.  Id. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
Holly presented two issues:  (1) whether the magistrate had sufficient, 
separate probable cause for the issuance of a nighttime search of Holly’s 
residence and vehicle; and (2) whether the evidence would be admissible 
due to either the good-faith or inevitable discovery exceptions.89  Holly is 
particularly interesting given the court found the nighttime execution of the 
warrant to be invalid as applied to the home, but valid as applied to the car 
outside.90  The court’s five justices were unable to write a unanimous 
opinion on the facts of the Holly case, which discusses aspects of North 
Dakota’s search and seizure law as it applies to law enforcement and 
judiciary branches across the state.91 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
Writing for the majority, Justice Maring92 began by addressing Holly’s 
claim that the warrant affidavit failed to show sufficient separate probable 
cause for authorizing a nighttime search.  The court first looked to North 
Dakota’s established case law.  Following precedent, Justice Maring 
acknowledged that the mere existence of drugs does not lead to an inference 
that evidence will be easily disposed of.93  A law enforcement officer must 
set forth facts for believing the evidence will be destroyed.94  Since Deputy 
Graham testified that unsworn statements were used to request nighttime 
execution of the warrant, the court relied only on the face of the affidavit 
for determining whether probable cause existed.95 
The search warrant in this case applied to Holly’s residence, persons at 
the residence, and vehicle.96  The affidavit included that: 
(1) Holly would be transporting marijuana and other unknown 
prescription drugs in his white Ford Ranger; (2) Holly advised 
Sesseman that he . . . would be leaving Whitefish, MT in the 
morning hours of 2/8/2011 and expected to arrive in Minot during 
the evening hours; (3) Holly was planning to purchase six pounds 
of marijuana and some prescription drugs to bring back to Minot; 
 
89.  State v. Holly, 2013 ND 94, ¶ 2, 833 N.W.2d 15, 20. 
90.  Id.  
91.  Chief Justice VandeWalle and Justice Kapsner concurred with the majority opinion.  
Justice Crothers concurred in part and dissented in part, and Justice Sandstrom dissented from the 
majority opinion. 
92.  Holly, ¶ 10, 833. N.W.2d at 21.  
93.  Id. ¶ 36, 833 N.W.2d at 26.  
94.  Id. 
95.  Id. ¶ 40, 833 N.W.2d at 28. 
96.  Id. ¶ 41. 
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(4) [b]ased upon [Deputy Graham’s] training and experience 
vehicles are often used for storage and hiding drugs related 
paraphernalia; (5) Sesseman witnessed Holly smoking marijuana 
in the residence; and (6) Deputy Graham observed a multi-colored 
glass smoking device, commonly called a bong, sitting on a 
dresser along the west wall of [Holly’s] bedroom through an open 
door.97 
Using a totality of the circumstances approach, Justice Maring wrote 
that a “vehicle’s inherent mobility provides exigent circumstances to 
reasonably infer that the illegal contraband would not be found again if law 
enforcement must wait and procure a search warrant.”98  Therefore, the 
separate probable cause necessary for nighttime execution of a search of 
Holly’s vehicle existed on the face of the affidavit.99  Distinguishing Roth, 
however, the majority opinion held that the warrant affidavit “did not 
contain particularized facts indicating the need to apprehend and search 
Holly’s residence at the time of the alleged commission of the crime” 
because it lacked information indicating that the evidence would be 
destroyed prior to daytime.100 
The majority opinion rejected the state’s argument that the good faith 
exception should apply in regards to the nighttime search of Holly’s 
residence.101  Instead, the majority found the good-faith exception102 did not 
apply because “a reasonably well-trained officer would know that this 
nighttime search warrant, which lacked in indicia of probable cause that the 
contraband would be easily destroyed or quickly removed from the 
residence, was invalid.”103  In addition, the majority declined to apply the 
inevitable discovery doctrine.104  The court found that the state had failed to 
prove law enforcement had not acted in bad faith when it disregarded search 
warrant procedure to accelerate the discovery of evidence.105 
 
97.  Id. (quotations omitted). 
98.  Id. ¶ 43. 
99.  Id. 
100.  Id. ¶ 47, 833 N.W.2d at 29-30. 
101.  Id. ¶ 52, 833 N.W.2d at 31. 
102.  An officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s authorization is not objectively reasonable, 
and suppression remains appropriate:  “when the warrant was based on an affidavit ‘so lacking in 
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’”  Id. ¶ 
50, 833 N.W.2d at 30. 
103.  Id. ¶ 52, 833 N.W.2d at 31. 
104.  Id. ¶ 56, 833 N.W.2d at 33. 
105.  Id. ¶ 61, 833 N.W.2d at 34. 
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B. JUSTICE CROTHERS’ CONCURRENCE IN PART AND  
DISSENT IN PART 
Justice Crothers disagreed with the majority’s opinion as it applied to 
the inevitable discovery doctrine and the suppression of evidence.106  
Justice Crothers first looked to the language of the Fourth Amendment and 
noted “[t]he Amendment does not address execution of warrants at night, 
and we must be guided by precedent to decide whether a particular search 
was lawful.”107  In addition, Justice Crothers stressed that the majority of 
the court agreed that the authorized warrant was valid in light of the Fourth 
Amendment.108  Rather than finding Officer Graham’s actions to be in bad 
faith, Justice Crothers reflected that Officer Graham was “[o]bviously 
mindful that execution of search warrants at night need explicit 
authorization” and sought and received judicial approval of such a 
search.109 
Justice Crothers reflected on the facts of Holly with a broad perspective 
when he wrote: 
Judicial authorization was received at the same time for nighttime 
execution of both the home and the vehicle warrants.  
Authorization for nighttime execution of neither warrant was 
supported by a showing of “separate probable cause.”  Yet we 
uphold the nighttime vehicle search based on the recognized 
exigency that vehicles are inherently mobile and the suspected 
contraband “would not be expected to be in Holly’s vehicle the 
following day or might be removed if the search was delayed to 
daytime.”110 
Justice Crothers also analyzed how the rationale for limiting nighttime 
searches applied to the facts of the case.111  For example, Justice Crothers 
noted that Holly and Holly’s girlfriend were seized immediately upon their 
arrival, which happened to be fourteen minutes later than the “inflexible, 
one size fits all, rule crafted by this Court that ‘daytime’ ends at 10:00 
p.m.”112  Since it was clear that neither Holly nor his girlfriend were asleep 
 
106.  Id. ¶ 79, 833 N.W.2d at 37. 
107.  Id. ¶ 80. 
108.  Id. ¶ 81. 
109.  Id. 
110.  Id. ¶ 82, 883 N.W.2d at 38 (internal citations omitted). 
111.  Id. ¶ 83.  Typically, restricting the execution of search warrants to specific “daytime” 
hours is done so as a safety precaution; there is inherent risk for law enforcement in nighttime 
searches, when a homeowner has likely been sleeping and is particularly vulnerable.  State v. 
Schmeets, 278 N.W.2d 401, 410 (N.D. 1979). 
112.  Holly, ¶ 83, 883 N.W.2d at 38 (citation omitted). 
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at the time the warrant was executed, and it was unlikely that Sesseman, the 
remaining roommate, was asleep “during execution of the warrants that his 
information and participation helped procure,” the rationale behind 
avoiding nighttime execution of a warrant was not served by the exclusion 
of evidence found in Holly’s residence.113 
Those additional facts, Justice Crothers noted, are particularly 
important in determining the applicability of the good-faith and inevitable 
discovery doctrines.114  Justice Crothers stated that he was compelled to 
agree that Officer Graham’s failure to establish separate probable cause to 
search the residence may not have been in good faith.115  Justice Crothers 
continued, however, by explaining that he did not agree with “the 
majority’s apparent leap from the lack of good faith under the good faith 
exception to a determination of bad faith under the inevitable discovery 
doctrine.”116  The test for the inevitable discovery doctrine, Justice Crothers 
explained, is the presence of bad faith, rather than the absence of good 
faith.117  Since the search of both Holly’s vehicle and residence would have 
been legal and in good-faith during daytime hours, Justice Crothers argued 
that the record did not support a conclusion that law enforcement’s actions 
were accomplished with bad faith when they occurred fourteen minutes 
late.118 
C. JUSTICE SANDSTROM’S DISSENT 
In dissent, Justice Sandstrom also began his analysis by looking to the 
language of the Fourth Amendment.119  Citing the United States Supreme 
Court, Justice Sandstrom emphasized that “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is reasonableness.”120  With this touchstone in mind, Justice 
Sandstrom wrote: 
The magistrate had determined there was probable cause to believe 
drugs and other evidence were inside the house, so once the search 
of the vehicle began in the driveway, one of two things was going 
to happen—those inside the house were going to remove or 
 
113.  Id. 
114.  Id. ¶ 84. 
115.  Id. ¶ 85. 
116.  Id. 
117.  Id. ¶ 87, 883 N.W.2d at 39. 
118.  Id. ¶ 90. 
119.  Id. ¶ 92, 833 N.W.2d at 39-40. 
120.  Id. (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)). 
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destroy the drugs and other evidence, or, as Justice Crothers 
concludes, they were inevitably going to be discovered.121 
Justice Sandstrom continued by referencing the Chief Justice’s 
concurrence in State v. Fields,122 which distinguished between the rejected 
per-se presumption that drugs are easily disposed of as it applies to  
no-knock violations and as it applies to nighttime execution of search 
warrants.123  The Chief Justice wrote that “evidence that a subject of a 
search warrant consumed or delivered drugs within a few hours of their 
receipt or made deliveries in the nighttime hours would justify issuance of a 
nighttime search warrant.”124  Emphasizing reasonableness, Justice 
Sandstrom advocated that “the high risk of destruction of the drugs in the 
house while the vehicle was being searched in the driveway provides the 
touchstone of reasonableness of the nighttime search warrant here.”125 
IV. IMPACT 
Both judiciary and law enforcement in North Dakota are impacted by 
the Holly decision.  Law enforcement, prosecutors, and magistrates will not 
be able to use either the good faith exception, or inevitable discovery 
doctrine, as a remedy to the exclusionary rule where a search warrant 
executed through nighttime service was not supported by separate probable 
cause.  The North Dakota Supreme Court’s decision warns warrant 
applicants and authorizers alike that what constitutes sufficient probable 
cause to search a premises at night can vary even in cases where the 
defendant, contraband, and location are the same.  The Holly decision 
serves to emphasize to North Dakota’s law enforcement that they will be 
held to a strict standard in cases where they seek to search for or seize 
evidence.  Although the good faith exception can apply where a defendant’s 
claim is based on the federal constitution, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
has not explicitly held that the same exception applies to the state 
constitution.126  As the court has stated, it is “axiomatic (that) our state 
constitution may provide greater protections than its federal counterpart.”127 
The Holly decision reflects the court’s view that separate and adequate 
probable cause for a nighttime search must be strictly enforced.  The strict 
interpretation of nighttime search requirements may serve to narrow law 
 
121.  Id.  
122.  2005 ND 15, ¶ 18, 691 N.W.2d 233, 238. 
123.  Id. ¶ 93, 833 N.W.2d at 40. 
124.  Fields, ¶ 18, 691 N.W.2d at 239. 
125.  Holly, ¶ 94, 833 N.W.2d at 40. 
126.  State v. Lunde, 2008 ND 142, ¶¶ 17, 19, 752 N.W.2d 630, 636-37. 
127.  State v. Herrick, 1999 ND 1, ¶ 22, 588 N.W.2d 847, 851. 
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enforcement’s ability to use them.  In fact, the Holly decision and those 
following it may actually serve to blur the lines between a nighttime 
warrant and a no-knock warrant.  Recently, Justice Sandstrom noted his 
view that the North Dakota Supreme Court “has gotten off track in equating 
nighttime search warrants with no-knock search warrants in drug cases.”128  
Looking to decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Justice 
Sandstrom found that “equating nighttime searches with no-knock searches 
[. . .] is misplaced.  What [the North Dakota Supreme Court has] done by 
opinion [it] can undo by opinion.  And I would do so.”129 
A. “REASONABLENESS” UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
As Justice Sandstrom explained, the Holly decision further defines 
what North Dakota recognizes as a reasonable search pursuant to the state 
constitution.130  While Justice Sandstrom expressed his view that the search 
in Holly was a reasonable one, the majority of the court sent the message to 
North Dakota law enforcement that it is in fact unreasonable for an officer 
or a judge to rely on an anytime warrant lacking in separate probable cause 
as it applies to a suspect’s place of residence.131  Whether it is a 
constitutional requirement for warrants to be served during the “daytime” 
hours of 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. may be interpreted differently from state to 
state.  For example, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found there was no 
constitutional violation where the defendant is not at home during the 
search.132  Perhaps a traditional, textual interpretation of the constitution 
would focus less on the exact time of execution and instead consider the 
“reasonableness” of the search in its entirety.  More broadly, the Holly case 
leaves us to wonder if it is unreasonable to execute a search warrant 
fourteen minutes late, and if suppression of the evidence is the correct 
remedy. 
 
128.  State v. Zeller, 2014 ND 65, ¶ 29, 845 N.W.2d 6, 15 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).  The 
goal of North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c), to protect citizens from the trauma of 
unwarranted nighttime searches, is no longer necessary.  The reality is that “[w]e are no longer a 
sleepy village where television goes off the air at 11 or 12, and every business is shut down during 
the night.  Today people work around the clock.  The drug culture appears to be particularly alive 
at night.”  Id.  
129.  Id. 
130.  Holly, ¶ 92, 833 N.W.2d at 40. 
131.  Id. 
132.  State v. Jordan, 726 N.W.2d 534, 541 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007), rev’d in State v. Jordan, 
742 N.W.2d 149, 151 (Minn. 2007). 
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B. DISTINGUISHING ROTH V. STATE 
In North Dakota’s brief, the government contended that Holly was 
analogous to Roth.133  In Roth, the court found probable cause to support the 
nighttime execution of a warrant where it was likely that Roth would be 
manufacturing methamphetamine during the night.134  In order for law 
enforcement to establish Roth’s role in the manufacturing process, the 
search needed to be conducted during those hours.135  The state alleged that, 
similar to the Roth case, law enforcement in the Holly case needed to 
execute the warrant at the actual time of Holly’s arrival in order to more 
effectively establish his role in the transport and delivery of the drugs.136  If 
law enforcement had done otherwise, the government stated, “evidence 
indicating that Holly had brought illegal substances back from Whitefish, 
Montana would not have been as convincing, and further, left open 
questions relating to the reliability of the reporting party.”137 
The North Dakota Supreme Court did not agree with the government’s 
position.138  Officer Graham’s affidavit stating that Holly and his girlfriend 
were transporting drugs into North Dakota and were expected to arrive in 
the evening hours was not sufficient to establish the separate probable cause 
needed for nighttime execution, because the information was not provided 
to the magistrate under sworn testimony.139  The Court distinguished Holly 
by stating that, unlike Roth, “the warrant affidavit did not contain 
particularized facts indicating the need to apprehend and search Holly’s 
residence at the time of the alleged commission of a crime.”140  The Court 
does not disclose whether those facts, had they been included in sworn 
testimony, would have been sufficient for nighttime execution. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Holly, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that without a separate 
showing of probable cause, law enforcement cannot rely on the good-faith 
exception or the inevitable discovery doctrine where there is nighttime 
service of a search warrant.141  While this ruling clarifies North Dakota’s 
two-prong application of the inevitable discovery doctrine, it remains 
 
133.  Brief for Appellee at 7, State v. Holly, 2013 ND 94, 833 N.W.2d 15 (No. 20120324).   
134.  Roth v. State, 2007 ND 112, ¶ 27, 735 N.W.2d 882, 892. 
135.  Id. 
136.  Holly, ¶ 46, 833 N.W.2d at 29. 
137.  Appellee’s Brief, supra note 133, at 7. 
138.  Holly, ¶ 47, 833 N.W.2d at 29. 
139.  Id. 
140.  Id. 
141.  Id. ¶ 1, 833 N.W.2d at 20. 
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unclear under what circumstances North Dakota will recognize a good-faith 
exception.  Holding that law enforcement could not have believed a search 
of Holly’s home to be reasonable, but finding the vehicle search valid, the 
Holly decision may contribute to confusion amongst North Dakota’s law 
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